

VZCZCXRO6062
PP RUEHSK
DE RUEHC #0541/01 3271619
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 231613Z NOV 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 3959
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 2684
RUEHSK/AMEMBASSY MINSK PRIORITY 1076
INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 5547
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 0352
RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY 7037
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/DTRA DULLES WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUETIAA/DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 STATE 120541

SIPDIS
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED
ASTANA AND KYIV FOR DTRO AND POL-MIL
MINSK FOR POL-MIL

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: [BO](#) [KACT](#) [KZ](#) [PARM](#) [RS](#) [UP](#)

SUBJECT: CONSULTATIONS ON THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT TO
GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATIONS LINKS (GGCLS) UPON DECEMBER 5
2009 EXPIRY OF THE START TREATY

¶1. (U) This is an action request for DTROs in Astana and Kyiv, and for Pol-Mil in Minsk. Please see paragraph 4.

¶2. (SBU) Background: The START Treaty expires on December 5, 2009. The START follow-on treaty will be a strictly bilateral treaty between the U.S. and Russia. There will thus be a drastic, but not complete, reduction in message traffic utilizing the Government to Government Communications Links (GGCLS) with Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. The U.S. and its partner countries therefore need to discuss the future of the GGCLS. Terminating the GGCL agreements with Kazakhstan and Ukraine requires twelve months, notice, that with Belarus ninety day's notice, but such decisions will require policy guidance. (NOTE: the Agreement with Belarus calls the GGCLS Continuous Communications Links - CCLs; the agreements with Ukraine and Kazakhstan refer to them as Secure Communications Links, and they will be referred to this way in the demarche language).

¶3. (SBU) Background continued: The original agreements to establish the GGCLS are based on both the INF and START treaties. Even with the expiration of START, the INF Treaty continues in force, and a small number of notifications are required yearly. The GGCLS can be maintained in an efficient and cost-effective manner, and there are significant benefits, both practical and political in nature, to the U.S. in maintaining direct, secure connections with Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus and in encouraging those countries to maintain their current NRRC-like structures, which help them to fulfill their obligations under other treaties. The US NRRC needs to discuss with its counterparts whether they are willing and able to maintain the current satellite-based configuration, or whether they wish to explore alternatives, such as an internet-based system similar to those in use for the notifications required under the various Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) treaty regimes. The US NRRC acknowledges that the Presidential election campaign now underway in Ukraine may make it difficult if not impossible for the Ukraine to engage in any substantive talks until well into the new year, but it does not want to request talks with Kazakhstan and Belarus without making a simultaneous request to Ukraine. The NRRC also believes that a demarche at this time may help the Ukrainians to focus on the steps they need to take to repair their GGL, which has been down since August 24, 2009, and to either complete their

unfinished satellite-link infrastructure or develop a reliable substitute.

¶4. (U) Action Request: The Department requests Embassy pass to the appropriate National Centers and MFA the points below. Points for Minsk are to be found at paragraph 5, Astana at paragraph 6, and Kyiv at paragraph 7.

The U.S. NRRC also encourages DTRO representatives to attend these discussions: please reply to contacts listed in para 8.

Please report contact information and any reaction to this paper.

¶5. (SBU/Releasable to Belarus) Begin Points for Minsk:

- For fifteen years, our Continuous Communication Links (CCLs) in 1994 have been valuable and productive in providing bilateral notifications required under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. The CCLs, or Government to Government Communications Links (GGCLs), as the United States usually refers to them, have proven to be a reliable and secure means of communication between our countries, in particular for exchanging treaty-related notifications.

- However, with the expiration of the START Treaty on December 5, 2009, there will be a drastic reduction in

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message traffic utilizing the CCLs, and we need to make decisions soon about the future of the CCLs.

- The United States believes that the CCLs can be operated in an efficient and cost-effective manner, and that there are mutual benefits in maintaining direct, secure connections between our nations.

- The CCLs have been the core around which our successful national centers for security and confidence building communications have developed. These centers now host not only the CCLs to support START and INF notifications, but also the network terminals to support Organization for Security and Cooperation notifications.

- We have devoted years to improving the CCLs to the current digital circuitry and state-of-the-art technology within a framework of a highly skilled communications staff, watch officers and engineers. Both sides of our CCL know how the links work, how the other end is staffed, and each side, information-passing capabilities and competencies. The CCLs provide a reliable and easy way for our two countries to exchange classified information directly, and an established backup capability for our senior officials to communicate with the each other. They serve as an instrument of mutual trust and cooperation between our respective governments.

- If the CCLs were discontinued, much of this expertise would be lost. As such, we anticipate that discontinuation of CCLs, and the ability for direct bilateral coordination of our notification regimes, could have additional negative impact to the infrastructure and operational capacity of our national centers.

- The United States proposes, therefore, to send a delegation from the Department of State, led by the Staff Director of the United States' National Center, the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center (NRRC), or his Deputy, as well as support staff from the U.S. NRRC, to discuss the possibilities for maintaining the CCLs after the December expiration of the START Treaty. The Division Chief of the Department of State's Special Message Operations Division of the Bureau of Information Resources Management (IRM) will accompany the NRRC delegation.

- The U.S. side would like to propose dates between February 1 and February 12, 2010, for these discussions. We envision one or two days of meetings to discuss the relevant issues.
- We are planning similar consultations with our counterparts in Kazakhstan and Ukraine.

16. (SBU/Releasable to Kazakhstan) Begin Points for Astana:

- For fifteen years, since the inauguration of our Secure Communication Links in 1994 to provide bilateral notifications required under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the United States and Kazakhstan, along with our national centers, have enjoyed a valuable and productive relationship. The Secure Communications Links, or Government to Government Communications Links (GGCLs), as the United States usually refers to them, have proven to be a very effective means of exchanging treaty-related notifications and providing rapid, reliable and secure communication between our countries.
- However, with the expiration of the START Treaty on December 5, 2009, there will be a drastic reduction in message traffic utilizing the Secure Communications Links, and we need to make decisions soon about the future of the links.
- The United States believes that the Secure Communications Links can be operated in an efficient and cost-effective manner, and that there are significant mutual benefits in maintaining direct, secure connections between our nations.

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- The Secure Communications Links have been the core around which our highly successful national centers for security and confidence building communications have developed. These centers now host not only the Secure Communications Links to support START and INF notifications, but also the network terminals to support Organization for Security and Cooperation notifications.

- We have devoted years to improving the Secure Communications Links to the current digital circuitry and state-of-the-art technology within a framework of a highly skilled communications staff, watch officers and engineers. Both sides of our Secure Communications Link know how the links work, how the other end is staffed, and each side's information-passing capabilities and competencies. The Secure Communications Links provide a reliable and easy way for our two countries to exchange classified information directly, and an established backup capability for senior officials to communicate directly with the President, Foreign Minister, and Minister of Defense in each country. They serve as an instrument of mutual trust and cooperation between our respective governments.

- If the Secure Communications Links were discontinued, much of this expertise would be lost and much work would have to be unnecessarily repeated if we sought to re-establish these capabilities at a later time. As such, we anticipate that discontinuation of Secure Communications Links, and direct bilateral coordination of our notification regimes, could have additional negative impact to the infrastructure and operational capacity of our national centers.

- The United States proposes, therefore, to send a delegation from the Department of State, led by the Staff Director of the United States' National Center, the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center (NRRC), or his Deputy, as well as support staff from the U.S. NRRC, to discuss the maintaining of the Secure Communications Links after the December expiration of the START Treaty. The Division Chief of the Department of

State,s Special Message Operations Division of the Bureau of Information Resources Management (IRM) will accompany the NRRC delegation.

- The U.S. side would like to propose dates between February 1 and February 12, 2010, for these discussions. We envision one or two days of meetings to discuss the relevant issues.
- We are planning similar consultations with our counterparts in Belarus and Ukraine.

End Points for Astana

17. (SBU/Releasable to Ukraine) Begin Points for Kyiv:

- For fifteen years, since the inauguration of our Secure Communications Links in 1994 to provide bilateral notifications required under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the United States and Ukraine, and our national centers, have enjoyed a valuable and productive relationship. The Secure Communications Links, or Government to Government Communications Links (GGCLS), as the United States usually refers to them, have in the past proven to be an effective means of exchanging treaty-related notifications and providing rapid, reliable and secure communication between our countries.

- However, with the expiration of the START Treaty on December 5, 2009, there will be a drastic reduction in message traffic utilizing the Secure Communications Links, and we need to make decisions soon about the future of the Secure Communications Links.

- The United States believes that the Secure Communications Links can be operated in an efficient and cost-effective manner, and that there are significant mutual benefits in maintaining direct, secure connections between our nations.

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SUBJECT: CONSULTATIONS ON THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT TO GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATIONS LINKS (GGCLS) UPON DECEMBER 5 2009 EXPIRY OF THE START TREA

- The Secure Communications Links have been the core around which our highly successful national centers for security and confidence building communications have developed. These centers now host not only the Secure Communications Links to support START and INF notifications, but also the network terminals to support OSCE notifications.

- We have devoted years to improving the Secure Communications Links to the current high performance level within a framework of a highly skilled communications staff, watch officers and engineers. Both sides of our Secure Communications Link know how the links work, how the other end is staffed, and each side's information-passing capabilities and competencies. The Secure Communications Links have provided a reliable and easy way for our two countries to exchange classified information directly, and when current problems are resolved, they can once again provide an established backup capability for senior officials to communicate directly.

- If the Secure Communications Links were discontinued, much of this expertise would be lost and much work would have to be unnecessarily repeated if we sought to re-establish these capabilities at a later time. As such, we anticipate that discontinuation of the Secure Communications Links, and direct bilateral coordination of our notification regimes, could have additional negative impact to the infrastructure and operational capacity of our national centers.

- The United States proposes, therefore, to send a delegation from the Department of State, led by the Staff Director of the United States, National Center, the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center (NRRC), or his Deputy, as well as support

staff from the U.S. NRRC, to discuss maintaining the Secure Communications Links after the December expiration of the START Treaty. The Division Chief of the Department of State's Special Message Operations Division of the Bureau of Information Resources Management (IRM) will accompany the NRRC delegation.

- The U.S. side would like to propose dates between February 1 and February 12, 2010, for these discussions. We envision one or two days of meetings to discuss the relevant issues.

- We are planning similar consultations with our counterparts in Belarus and Kazakhstan.

End Points for Kyiv

18. (U) Points of contact for the consultations are NRRC Senior Staff Officer Dennis Curry at (202) 647 1895 and Staff Officer Kevin Stickney at (202) 647 0026. The NRRC unclassified fax number is (202) 647 4892. Post assistance is greatly appreciated.
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